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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 4 1981 NUMBER 2
THE ZONE OF INTERESTS COMPONENT OF THE
FEDERAL STANDING RULES: ALIVE
AND WELL AFTER ALL?
Robert H Marquis*
Introduction
In two 1970 companion decisions, Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations v. Camp' and Barlow v. Collins,2 the
United States Supreme Court reformulated the federal rule of
standing to challenge administrative action allegedly taken in viola-
tion of a statute containing no express provision for review or of a
comparable provision of the United States Constitution. The refor-
mulation took the form of a two-part test: First, "whether the plain-
tiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise"; and second, "whether the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."
3
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
2. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
3. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970). The Court also held that judicial review of the governmental actions challenged in
Data Processing and Barlow was not barred under the provisions of Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976), which make actions nonreviewable if statutes preclude
review or the actions have been committed by law to agency discretion.
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The first prong of this test is, as the Court noted,4 derived from
Article III of the Constitution, which empowers federal constitu-
tional courts to decide only actual "cases" and "controversies."' Ac-
cordingly, its restatement in Data Processing and Barlow obviously
represented no departure from preexisting law.6 The second prong
of the test is not mandated by the Constitution and constituted a
new " 'rule of self-restraint'" framed by the Court "for its own gov-
ernance" (and, of course, the governance of lower federal courts).'
Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion in Data Processing and
Barlow, in which Justice White joined, concurring in their results
but dissenting from their rationale 8 In the Brennan-White view,
only an adequate allegation of injury in fact should be necessary to
confer standing. Once a plaintiff was determined to have standing
on this basis, two further and discrete issues would be examined:
reviewability, one aspect of which would be "whether Congress
meant to deny or to allow judicial review of the agency action at the
instance of the plaintiff"; and the merits-which, in Barlow, would
present the question, "[D]oes the statutory language 'making a crop'
create a legally protected interest for tenant farmers in the form of a
prohibition against the assignment of their federal benefits to secure
cash rent?"9
The reaction of many professorial writers and commentators to
the zone test announced in Data Processing and Barlow was, from
the outset, negative.' 0 While viewing it as a liberalization of previ-
ously enunciated federal standing law, members of this group be-
lieved that it was not liberal enough. Professor Kenneth C. Davis,
in particular, who had previously argued for a view of standing sim-
4. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
350 F.2d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966).
7. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970).
8. Id. at 167.
9. Id at 168-69. (Emphasis added herein unless otherwise noted.)
10. See generally, Albert, Standing to Challenge Adunistrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 450 (1970); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability and Al That-. A
Behavorial Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1972); Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the
Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1443, 1478-82 (1971); Tushnet,
The New Law of Standing. A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
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ilar to that expressed by Justices Brennan and White," l has been
one of the test's most consistent critics. He has also suggested on
several occasions that the Supreme Court has possibly or probably
abandoned the test in favor of the Brennan-White approach, and
that, in any event, the treatment of the test by the lower federal
courts has deprived it of much, if any, real meaning. 12 In view of
Professor Davis' status as a leading authority in the field of adminis-
trative law, it seems likely that his pronouncements of the zone test's
impending or actual demise have carried weight with some lower
federal court judges. 13
With deference to Professor Davis and those who share his
opinion, it has seemed to me that the zone test is deserving of a more
sympathetic professorial press than it has generally received, and
that the obituaries for it have been premature. The latter thesis
finds direct support in a number of decisions, including the very re-
cent one of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Control Data Corporation v. Baldridge.14 That
decision expressly rejected the Davis hypothesis that the zone test
has been or may have been abandoned by the Supreme Court, and
applied the test to deny standing to plaintiffs who, in the court's
opinion, had unquestionably pleaded injury in fact. In light of Con-
trol Data, it seems appropriate to reexamine the zone test at this
time, with particular reference to its origins, parallels in other areas
of the law, application in Control Data and some other decisions,
and possible modifications in the interest of increased workability.
Pre-Zone Test Federal Standing Law
The zone test, when announced in Data Processing and Barlow,
had identifiable antecedents. Prior to these two cases, the legal in-
terest test embodied the dominant prudential limitation on federal
standing. That test evolved initially in suits against private rather
than public defendants. It began to emerge somewhat murkily as
early as 1838 ' 5 and was first clearly stated some fifty years later in
11. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 291-94 (1958).
12. Id. at 175-78 (Supp. 1980).
13. See, e.g., Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 467 F. Supp. 791,
796 (N.D. Ala. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 636 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3238 (1981).
14. 28 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 86,642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3237 (1981).
15. See Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91 (1838).
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Railroad Company v. Ellerman. 6 Ellerman was a lessee from the
City of New Orleans of commercial wharves which the City had
constructed along the Mississippi River. Pursuant to authorizing
legislation enacted by the State of Louisiana in 1869 after construc-
tion of the City's wharves, the Railroad erected a similar wharf in
New Orleans, which the Railroad's receivers later leased to other
parties. Ellerman sought to enjoin performance of this lease agree-
ment, contending that the City had a franchise right (which he could
assert as its assignee) to act as the sole operator of commercial
wharves within its municipal limits; that the State law authorizing
the Railroad to construct a rival wharf was therefore invalid as a
taking of property without due process; and that, in any event, the
State law conferred on the Railroad only a right to operate a wharf
in conjunction with its business as a rail carrier, whereas the lease
agreement contemplated operation of the wharf for general com-
mercial purposes whether or not connected with such business. The
Supreme Court disposed of the due process question by citing Loui-
siana cases which indicated that the State rather than the City had
ultimate control over wharf construction within the City's bounda-
ries. It then went on to reverse the lower court's ruling in favor of
Ellerman on the issue of ultra vires use of the wharf on the ground
that Ellerman lacked standing to raise it, saying:
The sole remaining question then, is, whether Ellerman, as
assignee of the city, has any legal interest which entitles him to
enjoin the company from using its wharf as a public wharf be-
yond the limits of such use, as defined by that construction of the
joint resolution. If he has such interest, it can only consist in
preventing competition with himself as a wharfinger, which such
more extensive use of the railroad property would create. ...
But if the competition in itself, however injurious, is not a wrong
of which he could complain against a natural person, being the
riparian proprietor, how does it become so merely because the
author of it is a corporation acting ultra vires?. . . The only in-
jury of which he can be heard in a judicial tribunal to complain is
the invasion of some legal or equitable right. If he asserts that
the competition of the railroad company damages him, the an-
swer is, that it does not abridge or impair any such right. If he
alleges that the railroad company is acting beyond the warrant of
the law, the answer is, that a violation of its charter does not of
itself injuriously affect any of his rights. The company is not
16. 105 U.S. 166 (1881).
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shown to owe him any duty which it has not performed.' 7
During the 1930s, the legal interest test was applied to deny
standing in a number of well-known cases brought against federal
officers or agencies. In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee
Valley Authority,"8 for example, a number of private power compa-
nies were held to be without standing to challenge the constitution-
ality of or statutory authority for the TVA power program because,
at least in the absence of franchises giving them exclusive service
rights in their respective areas, they, like Ellerman, had no legal in-
terest in freedom from competititon and therefore no standing to
question the legality of competition to which they were in fact sub-
jected. 9 The legal interest test continued to be applied in other de-
cisions, including the decision of the Eighth Circuit 20 which was
reversed in Data Processing.
Meanwhile, in its 1924 decision in The Chicago Junction Case,2'
the Supreme Court began to develop a variant approach to standing
based on a requirement that the plaintiff possess a "special" or "pro-
tected" rather than a "legal" interest. That case involved the acqui-
sition by the New York Central of control over two previously
independent Chicago terminal railroads which switched traffic be-
tween plants of shippers on their lines and the lines of various trunk
line railroads which competed for the carriage of such traffic be-
tween Chicago and other points. Six trunk line competitors of the
New York Central brought suit challenging an order of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission approving the New York Central's ac-
tion. The Court held that they had standing to do so because an
applicable statute22 entitled them to compete on equal terms with
the New York Central for traffic in and out of Chicago, and by so
doing the statute gave them a "special interest" in preventing an
improper transfer of control of the terminal railroads inconsistent
with such equality.2
3
The Chicago Junction Case approach was followed and refined
17. Id. at 173-74.
18. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
19. Id. at 137-39. See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884
(1955).
20. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.
1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
21. 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
22. Interstate Commerce Act, § 5, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920, 49
U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
23. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S, 258, 267 (1924).
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by the Supreme Court in its 1968 decision in Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co. 24 That case, like Tennessee Electric Power, had to do
with the Tennessee Valley Authority's electric power program. The
TVA Act had been amended in 1959 by the addition of a new sec-
tion 15d,2 5 the primary purpose of which was to authorize TVA's
issuance of revenue bonds to help finance new power facilities.
During congressional consideration of the amendment, concern was
expressed that the new financing authority might enable and en-
courage TVA to expand substantially its then existing area of power
supply and to compete on a broad basis with private utilities in their
established power service areas.26 Congress sought to allay such
concern by including in the legislation a provision allowing some
relatively minor extensions of TVA service but prohibiting any ma-
jor expansion. This provision directed that, subject to certain excep-
tions, TVA should "make no contracts for the sale or delivery of
power which would have the effect of making [it] or its [municipal
or cooperative power] distributors, directly or indirectly, a source of
power supply outside the area for which [it] or its distributors were
the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957," or, also subject
to certain limitations, an "additional area extending not more than
five miles around the periphery of such area." Two small Tennessee
towns which had been served by the Kentucky Utilities Company
(KU) elected to receive service instead from a distribution system
utilizing TVA-supplied power, and KU sued to enjoin the new serv-
ice on the ground that because of the statutory limitation neither
TVA nor any TVA distributor could validly provide it. Like the
plaintiffs in Tennessee Electric Power, KU had no exclusive
franchises to serve the two towns. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
held that it had standing to sue (although upholding on the merits
TVA's determination that the two towns were inside the periphery of
its 1957 area and that the proposed service to them was therefore
proper).
In holding that KU had standing, the Court distinguished Ten-
nessee Electric Power and other similar cases as involving constitu-
tional and statutory provisions which were not concerned with
affording protection against competitive injury, whereas
it has been the rule, at least since the Chicago Junction Case...
that when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect
24. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4 (1976).
26. See Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 n.6 (1968).
266. [Vol. 4:261
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a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured
competitor has standing to require compliance with that
21provision.
The Court then noted that the legislative history of section 15d
showed-and, indeed, TVA agreed-that the territorial limitation
provision was intended to protect private utilities from TVA compe-
tition beyond that authorized. Accordingly, "Since respondent is
thus in the class which § 15d is designed to protect, it has standing
under familiar judicial principles to bring this suit. . . and no ex-
plicit statutory provision is necessary to confer standing."2
Thus, when Data Processing and Barlow were decided two
years later, the groundwork for the zone test had already been laid,
and the Court cited and relied on Hardin in announcing and apply-
ing it.29 However, whereas Hardin upheld standing in the case of a
plaintiff which was found to be clearly within the zone of interests
protected by the relevant statutory provision, the zone test enunci-
ated in Data Processing and Barlow requires only that a plaintiff be
"arguably" within such a protected zone.
Some Closely Related Concepts
The antecedents of the zone test mentioned above have been
accorded general recognition in recent legal literature. What seems
to have been much less well recognized is the kinship which the
zone test can claim with other established American jurisprudential
concepts.
The basic thrust of the zone test was aptly summarized by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Diggs v. Shultz.3" In that case, per-
sons who were denied entry or reentry into Rhodesia sought to chal-
lenge a congressional decision to permit importation of Rhodesian
materials into the United States as in violation of an embargo
against such materials embodied in a United Nations Security
Council resolution. They were held to meet the zone test because
they were "unquestionably within reach of [the resolution's] purpose
and among its intended beneficiaries.'"31
Once the zone test is phrased in these terms, its affinity to other
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970).




limiting legal rules becomes apparent. One such rule, as already
suggested in the discussion of Railroad Company v. Ellerman,32 is
that which determines the circumstances in which a federal statute
regulating general or private, as distinguished from exclusively gov-
ernmental, conduct will be deemed to confer by implication a pri-
vate right of action to enforce that statute. In its 1975 decision in
Cort v. Ash ,3 the Supreme Court listed four factors to be considered
in resolving this kind of problem, 34 and in a series of subsequent
decisions the Court has elaborated on their content and applica-
tion.35 In one recent decision, California v. Sierra Club,36 a case in-
volving the prohibition in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189931
against unauthorized obstructions to the navigable capacity of wa-
ters of the United States, the Court noted that "the initial considera-
tion is whether the plaintiff is a member of a class for 'whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted.' "38 In further delineating
this concept, the Court added that "[t]he question is not simply who
would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer
federal rights upon these bene.ficiaries It then analyzed the lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act, and concluded that they did
not "suggest that the Act was intended to create federal rights for
the especial benefit of a class of persons but rather was intended to
benefit the public at large through a general regulatory scheme to be
administered by the then Secretary of War."4
Similar kinds of problems are common in the field of ordinary
torts. In negligence cases, for example, courts are often called upon
to determine whether a defendant's violation of a penal statute, an
ordinance, or a regulation should be regarded as constituting negli-
gence. The answer depends on whether the purpose of the law, or-
dinance, or regulation is to protect the class of which the plaintiff is
a member and the interest which he is asserting against the kind of
32. See text at note 16 supra.
33. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
34. Id. at 78.
35. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981); Uni-
versities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 101 S. Ct. 1451 (1981); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
36. 101 S. Ct. 1775 (1981).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
38. California v. Sierra Club, 101 S. Ct. 1775, 1779 (1981).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1781.
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hazards and harms which the suit involves.41 Here again, the first of
these criteria requires a determination whether, as the Fifth Circuit
noted in Manning v. M/VSea Road, the plaintiff is "within the class
of intended beneficiaries" of the law, ordinance, or regulation.4 2 It
may be noted that, according to the rule set out in the current Torts
Restatement, a statute, ordinance, or regulation does not provide a
standard of conduct applicable in a negligence action if its exclusive
purpose is to protect either governmental interests or rights enjoyed
by individuals only as members of the public generally.43
Another analogue exists in the law of contracts. Where per-
formance of a contract will benefit one who is not a party to it, his
right to enforce it depends, again, on whether he is an "intended" or
only an "incidental" beneficiary. 44 The close relationship between
this rule and the zone test is illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion in Gallagher v. Continental Insurance Company.4 In Gallagher
the plaintiffs attacked the validity of a tunnel construction contract
entered into by the State of Colorado. They contended, among
other things, that as citizens and taxpayers they were third-party
beneficiaries of the contract. The court referred to its holding in an
earlier case that "the right of a third-party to sue on a contract made
for his benefit requires that the right be apparent from the express
provisions of the contract and that the benefit cannot be incidental
'but must be a direct benefit intended by the contracting parties to
accrue in favor of the third party.' "46 It then held that the plaintiffs
in the case before it had no more than an incidental interest, and
that, accordingly, "the action was properly dismissed [by the trial
court] because the plaintiffs have no standing to sue.
Some Post-Data Processing and Barlow Zone- Test Decisions
Since Data Processing and Barlow, the Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated a number of additional prudential limitations on stand-
ing.48 But it has also referred specifically to the zone test in at least
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965); Marshall v. Isthmian Lines,
Inc., 334 F.2d 131, 134 (5th Cir. 1964).
42. 417 F.2d 603, 608 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
45. 502 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 833.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Simon v. East-
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eight subsequent cases.49 These references have contained no sug-
gestion that the development of additional prudential tests has ren-
dered the zone test obsolete. To the contrary, in Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood, ° which contains the latest such reference (at
the time this article was written), the Court noted some of the more
recently developed prudential limitations, and then appended a
footnote reading:
There are other nonconstitutional limitations on standing to
be applied in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Simon v. East-
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976)
("the interest of the plaintiff, regardless of its nature in the abso-
lute, [must] at least be 'arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated' by the statutory framework within which
his claim arises," quoting Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1969)). 5 1
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission5 2 the Court
did not merely refer to the zone test but applied it in determining
that the plaintiffs had standing. In that case, regional (i.e., non-New
York) stock exchanges contended that a New York law unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against interstate commerce by taxing out-of-
state securities sales at a higher rate than in-state sales. The
Supreme Court expressed its agreement with the New York courts
"that the Exchanges have standing under the two-part test of Data
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
Prudential limitations, unlike the constitutional "cases" and "controversies" limitation,
may be waived by Congress. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1979); Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320-21 n.3 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 n.16 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 176 n.9 (1974); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 & n.13 (1973); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 & n.5 (1972); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46
(1970). See also Investment Co. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1971).
Professor Davis seems to suggest that the zone test was not mentioned by the Supreme
Court in any cases after Data Processing and Barlow until Boston Stock Exchange and Glad-
stone. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 176, 188 (Supp. 1980). If this is his im-
plication, it is obviously mistaken; indeed, the reference to the test in Gladstone consists
largely of a quotation from Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976).
50. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
51. Id. at 100 n.6.
52. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
270 [Vol. 4:261
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Processing Service v. Camp" and held with regard to the zone test
that:
The Exchanges are asserting their right under the Commerce
Clause to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory
taxes on their business and they allege that the transfer tax indi-
rectly infringes on that right. Thus, they are "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected . . .by the . . . constitutional
guarantee in question." Id, at 153. Moreover, the Exchanges
brought this action also on behalf of their members. "[Ain asso-
ciation may have standing solely as the representative of its mem-
bers. . .[if it] allege[s] that its members, or any one of them, are
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the chal-
lenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case
had the members themselves brought suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 511 (1975). See also National Motor Freight Assn. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 458-460 (1958). The Exchanges' complaint alleged that their
members traded on their own accounts in securities subject to the
New York transfer tax. The members therefore suffer an actual
injury within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce
Clause, and the Exchanges satisfy the requirements for represen-
tational standing.
3
Professor Davis, in expressing doubt about the importance of
the foregoing language in relation to the current status of the zone
test, has noted that it, like the language quoted earlier from Glad-
stone, appears in a footnote.54 This seems to me to be unimportant
since the footnote is equal in length to a page or more of text-and,
in any event, it contains a direct holding that the plaintiffs had
standing only because their allegations satisfied the zone test as well
as the requirement of injury in fact.
Moreover, the opinion in Boston Stock Exchange was written
by Justice White, one of the two dissenters from the rationale of
Data Processing and Barlow. It hardly seems likely that Justice
White would have applied the zone test as he did if he believed,
with Professor Davis, that the Court had or might have abandoned
it in favor of the approach which he and Justice Brennan had advo-
cated in Data Processing and Barlow.
The suggestion has also been made that the Supreme Court's
decision in Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study
53. Id. at 320-21 n.3. The test was also applied in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S.
45 (1970), and, apparently, in Investment Co. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
54. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 175-76, 188 (Supp. 1980).
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Group, Inc. 11 is inconsistent with the continued existence of the zone
test.5 6 That case upheld the standing of environmental organiza-
tions and their members to challenge (albeit unsuccessfully) the con-
stitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,57 which limits liability for a
single nuclear accident to $560 million and provides a system of
government insurance to help protect operators of nuclear power
plants up to that amount. The Court noted that the plaintiffs met
the requirements of injury in fact and of some prudential limitations
which the Court identified without mentioning the zone test.
The thesis that Duke's silence concerning the zone test may in-
dicate its abandonment seems to me unsound for two reasons: First,
Gladstone, which reaffirmed the zone test, was decided after Duke.
Second, the absence of any mention of the zone test in Duke seems
readily explainable by the fact that the constitutional provision there
alleged to have been violated was the fifth amendment. If a plaintiff
sufficiently alleges that his liberty or property has been taken with-
out due process, he is necessarily within the protective ambit of the
fifth amendment and any discussion of its zone of protected interests
or of whether he is one of its intended beneficiaries would be super-
fluous. Indeed, in Rakas v. Illinois," the Supreme Court held that
definition of rights under another portion of the Bill of Rights, the
fourth amendment, "is more properly placed within the purview of
substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."59
It also noted that this approach was "consonant with that which the
Court already has taken with respect to the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, which also is a purely personal
right ."60
Lower federal court decisions discussing and applying the zone
test cannot be analyzed in any detail within the confines of this arti-
cle. As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Control Data, such
decisions have reflected some differences in viewpoint and ap-
proach.6 1 The Eighth Circuit, for example, stated in Park View
55. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
56. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 176 (Supp. 1980); Alabama ex rel
Baxley v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 467 F. Supp. 791, 796 (N.D. Ala. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 636 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3238 (1981).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
58. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
59. Id. at 140.
60. Id. at 140 n.8 (emphasis added). See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-40
n.18 (1979).
61. 28 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 86,650-51.
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Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack62 its "preference for simplifying
the 'law on standing.' We think that all that is required for a plain-
tiff to have standing to sue for a constitutional or a statutory viola-
tion is a showing of 'injury in fact.' "63 Despite this expressed
preference, the Eighth Circuit subsequently applied the zone test to
deny standing in Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States64 and
Roadway Inns of America, Inc. v. Frank.65
Control Data itself contains one of the fullest and most
thoughtful analyses of the zone test so far available.66 The case
grew out of problems related to expanding government agency
purchases of automatic data processing equipment. In 1965 a stat-
ute known as the Brooks Act 67 was enacted to bring about more
coordinated and economical government purchases in this field.
Previously, government agencies had purchased computer main-
frames and peripheral equipment from "systems" manufacturers
who could offer both. A General Accounting Office study had indi-
cated that economies could be realized if companies supplying only
peripheral equipment were enabled to compete with the systems
manufacturers in offering to meet governmental peripheral equip-
ment needs. This necessitated development of standards for inter-
faces between mainframes and peripheral components. The Brooks
Act authorized the Department of Commerce to develop such stan-
dards for general government use, which it did. Four manufacturers
and suppliers brought suit challenging these standards as arbitrary,
capricious, and beyond the Secretary's statutory authority. Their
contention was that, contrary to the Secretary's finding, the stan-
dards were so drawn as unduly to favor International Business Ma-
chines, and in addition were already obsolete at the time of their
promulgation and would tend to freeze technological development.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in an opinion written by
Judge Tamm, upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the case because
of the plaintiffs' lack of standing.68 The plaintiffs, the court held,
clearly met the requirement of injury in fact since, according to the
allegations of their complaint, they would either have to expend
62. 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 1212 n.4.
64. 533 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1976).
65. 541 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
66. Other cases are collected in 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 50-23 to -32 (1981).
67. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1976).
68. Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 28 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 86,642, 86,653, (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3237 (1981).
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time and effort in complying with the standards or lose the opportu-
nity to compete for a substantial amount of government business.
They could not, however, meet the zone of interests test because the
court's study of the Brooks Act, the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act which it amended, and applicable legislative
history convinced it that Congress had in mind only one objective-
"lower government [data processing] costs ...Competition was
not, therefore, valued for itself, but for the benefits it could bring the
government. ' 69 In short, the exclusive purpose of the relevant statu-
tory provisions was to protect governmental interests, and the plain-
tiffs were not among their intended beneficiaries.
The court's discussion of a number of its earlier decisions, par-
ticularly Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal7" and Scanwell
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,7 is of special interest. Tax Analysts
dealt with an attempt to invalidate Internal Revenue Service Rul-
ings concerning the application to oil companies of section 901 of
the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax credits to American
companies operating abroad in order to avoid double taxation. The
rulings were attacked as more favorable to the companies than the
statute permitted. The plaintiffs were a nonprofit corporation orga-
nized to promote tax reform, its executive director, and an individ-
ual domestic oil producer. The court held that the interest of the
first two plaintiffs in collection of appropriate taxes was insufficient
to give them taxpayer standing, and that the third plaintiff failed to
meet the zone test.
In reaching its determination as to the latter point, the court
analyzed the zone test at some length and stated three basic conclu-
sions regarding its proper application: First, only the particular stat-
utory provision on which a lawsuit is based rather than the entire
statute of which it is a part should ordinarily be looked to in seeking
to determine the existence of arguable legislative protective intent
(which meant, in the case before it, examining only section 901
rather than the entire Internal Revenue Code with its general policy
provisions).7 z Second, mere adverse impact on a plaintiff who is not
himself subject to the statutory provision-in Tax Analysts, one
whose competitive position as a domestic producer might have suf-
69. Id. at 86,65 1.
70. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
71. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The court did say that both the specific and general
might be relevant when they shared identity of purpose.
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fered by reason of overly favorable tax treatment of competitors re-
lying on foreign production-does not arguably bring him within
the statutory zone.73 Third, as a general proposition, only the actual
language of the relevant statutory provision, and not its legislative
history, should be looked to in seeking to discern whether a plain-
tiff's asserted interest is arguably within the protected zone.74
Control Data reaffirmed Tax Analysts on the first of these
points.7 It did not deal directly with the second, but seems basically
in accord with the Tax Analysts position. On the third point, the
Control Data court did examine the legislative history of and subse-
quent Congressional commentary concerning the Brooks Act, while
explaining that its doing so was not believed to be in conflict with
the Tax Analysts discussion of the point because "congressional in-
tent regarding ADP suppliers is clearly reflected in the legislative
history and confirmed by the longstanding oversight of the Act's
implementation ... 76
Control Data's examination of legislative history and later
oversight seems to me sound, but more difficult to reconcile with the
Tax Analysts discussion than the court's explanation implies. Es-
sentially Control Data seems to say simply that legislative history
and later oversight should be taken into account where they are
helpful in throwing light on Congress' intent but not otherwise-an
apparently reasonable approach but one that Tax Analysts did not
take. If legislative history and oversight may be looked to when
helpful, it seems questionable whether statutory context should not
also be examined insofar as it may throw light on the intended
meaning of the particular statutory provision involved in the law-
suit.77 The opinion in Tax Analysts suggests that the court's reluc-
tance to consider legislative history-and possibly statutory context
as well-may have been based on its assumption that a plaintiff's
status as an intended statutory beneficiary will ordinarily have to be
examined first in relation to standing and again, on a somewhat dif-
73. Id. at 143-45.
74. Id. at 141-43.
75. Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 28 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 86,642, 86,650, & n.20
(D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3237 (1981).
76. Id. at 86,650 n.21.
77. The general rule of statutory construction is, of course, that a statute will be read as
a whole and each of its provisions construed in the light of other related provisions. See,
e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650
(1974); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
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ferent basis, in relation to the merits.78 This assumption, which was
certainly reasonable in light of the Supreme Court's language in
Data Processing and Barlow, highlights what seems to me, for rea-
sons discussed later in this article,79 the major problem with regard
to the zone test but one which is susceptible of relatively easy
solution.
Control Data expressly refused to extend Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer,80 on which the plaintiffs had strongly relied.8 '
Scanwell, which was decided just prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Data Processing and Barlow, has been the subject of much
comment and controversy. The case involved responses by two
would-be government contractors to an invitation by the Federal
Aviation Administration for bids on airport landing systems. The
invitation contained a provision requiring that each bid be on a sys-
tem which had already been installed and tested in at least one loca-
tion. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. submitted the low bid and Scanwell the
next lowest bid. All components of the system offered by Cutler-
Hammer had previously been installed and tested, but some of them
at one location and others at a different location. Applicable regula-
tions (embodying previously established principles of government
contracting) required that bids materially deviating from the re-
quirements of an invitation be rejected as nonresponsive, but also
provided that immaterial deviations could be waived. The FAA de-
termined that the installation and testing of the components of Cut-
ler-Hammer's system at different locations rather than at the same
location was an immaterial deviation and awarded it the contract as
the low bidder. Scanwell brought suit challenging the award, and
the District of Columbia Circuit, in an opinion also written by
Judge Tamm, held that it had standing.
In reaching this result, the Scanwell court made three major
points: First, the plaintiff, having alleged injury in fact (loss of a
contract), should be permitted to sue as a "private attorney general"
to "satisfy the public interest in having agencies follow the regula-
tions which control government contracting. ' 82 Second, the "law of
standing was greatly modified by the passage of the Administrative
78. Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
79. Infra.
80. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
81. Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 28 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 86,642, 86,646-50 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3237 (1981).
82. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Procedure Act," and that Act's legislative history indicates that it
was intended to confer standing on anyone "aggrieved in fact."83
Third, the "basic approach" taken in the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. ,84 denying standing in cir-
cumstances decribed below, had been "legislatively reversed by the
Congress" in modifying the Public Contracts Act 85 by adoption of
the so-called Fulbright Amendment 86 to that Act.87
There appear to be obvious flaws in the Scanwell court's treat-
ment of the private attorney general concept88 and the legislative
history of the Administrative Procedure Act. 89 The court's conclu-
83. Id. at 865.
84. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
85. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976), commonly referred to as the Walsh-Healey Act.
86. 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1976).
87. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
88. The Supreme Court held in Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), and Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), that persons injured in the constitutional sense could
challenge administrative action as representatives of the public-but only because a statute
authorized them to do so. The Court was not able to point to any similar statutory authori-
zation in Scanwell.
89. The item of legislative history primarily relied on by the court was language which
it said was included in "the Senate Report which accompanied the act." This language
ended with a statement, emphasized by the court, that "[i]f a party can show that he is
'suffering legal wrong'. . . he should have some means of judicial redress." Scanwell Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The court's reliance on this language seems subject to serious question on three counts:
First, "legal wrong," as used in the 1940s by those familiar with the legal interest test then in
vogue, probably had a restricted meaning, as indicated by the Attorney General's comments
quoted below. Second, the quoted language was used in relation to reviewability under
section 10(c) of the draft bill being discussed, not to standing under section 10(a). See S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (hereinafter, "S. Doc. No. 248") 37-38 (1946). Third, the
language was not included in the Senate Committee report on the legislation as stated by the
court, but in a committee print circulated in connection with an earlier draft of the legisla-
tion than the one actually enacted. S. Doc. No. 248, 11, 37-38, 191.
At the same time, the court overlooked legislative history which might well have been
viewed as pointing strongly to, if not virtually mandating, a conclusion opposite to that
which the court reached. After circulation of the committee print referred to above, the
Department of Justice, other federal agencies, and various private organizations and groups
held discussions of the proposed legislation extending over a period of months. Thereafter,
a revised version of the bill was introduced and endorsed by the Attorney General in letters
to the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. S. Doc. No. 248, 19, 223,
406. To these letters, the Attorney General attached identical appendices setting out his
analysis of the revised bill's provisions. Regarding section 10(a), the Attorney General
stated:
Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute,
shall be entitled to judicial review of such action. This reflects existing law. In
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes (302 U.S. 464), the Supreme Court stated the rule
concerning persons entitled to judicial review. Other cases having an important
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sion about the effect of the Fulbright Amendment on the authority
of Lukens Steel-which is more directly related to the subject of this
article-also appears questionable. The Public Contracts Act, en-
acted in 1936, has nothing to do with the requirement that, in most
formally advertised government procurement, contracts must be
awarded to low bidders if they are otherwise qualified. That re-
quirement derives from a different and much earlier statute, R.S.
§ 3709.90 The Public Contracts Act provides that in government
supply contracts for more than $10,000, sellers must agree to a
number of stipulations. One of these obligates them to pay their
employees engaged in producing the contracted supplies "not less
than the minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor
to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on simi-
lar work. . . in the locality in which the. . . supplies. . . are to be
manufactured or furnished under such contract."9'
Lukens Steel dealt with a wage determination by the Secretary
for the steel industry. In making the determination, she had divided
bearing on this subject are Massachusetts v. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), The Chicago
Junction Case (264 U.S. 258), Sprunt & Son v. United States (281 U.S. 249), and
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. (310 U.S. 113). An important decision interpreting the
meaning of the terms "aggrieved" and "adversely affected" is Federal Communica-
tions Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station (309 U.S. 470).
S. Doc. No. 248, 230, 413.
Not only was this explanation never challenged, but when the author of the legislation,
Senator McCarran, was questioned about the meaning of section 10(a) during Senate debate
on it, he quoted the Attorney General's explanation in full and then added:
Mr. President, I have referred the Senator to that expression coming from the
Attorney General, in connection with this bill, to indicate to him and to the Senate
the meticulous study which we have tried to give to this bill, so that we may con-
strue the terms in such a way that there may be no divergence of views when we get
through.
S. Doc. No. 248, 310; 92 CONG. REC. 2153 (1946).
See also, as further indicating contemporary understanding of section 10(a), Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., Administrative Procedure Act With Explanation 20 (1946); Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 95-96 (1947). As noted in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546
(1978), the Attorney General's Manual has been accorded some deference by the Supreme
Court (and other federal courts) "because of the role played by the Department of Justice in
drafting the legislation."
The Scanwell court also cited Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), and
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), in support of its conclusion with re-
spect to section 10(a). Hardin, as discussed at page 266 supra, involved a plaintiff which
clearly had a statutorily protected interest. The question presented in Abbott Laboratories
was whether a rule issued by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was subject to judicial
review in advance of its enforcement by the Commissioner; the issue was thus one of ripe-
ness for judicial review, not standing of particular parties to obtain it.
90. Now codified in 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
91. 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1976).
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the country into six large areas and then determined prevailing
wages in each such "locality." A number of iron and steel manufac-
turers challenged the determination on the ground that "locality," as
used in the Act, referred to a much smaller geographic area than
any of the six areas used by the Secretary. The Supreme Court,
reversing a decision of the District of Columbia Circuit, held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing, stating that:
Respondents, to have standing in court, must show an injury or
threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the
public's interest in the administration of the law. They claim a
standing by asserting that they have particular rights under and
even apart from statute to bid and negotiate for Government
contracts free from compliance with the determination made by
the Secretary of Labor for their industry. Respondents point to
Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, 41 U.S.C.A. § 5, and to the
Public Contracts Act itself.
Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes requires for the Gov-
ernment's benefit that its contracts be made after public advertis-
ing. It was not enacted for the protection of sellers and confers
no enforceable rights upon prospective bidders.
• . . [The Public Contracts Act] was not intended to be a
bestowal of litigable rights upon those desirous of selling to the
Government; it is a self-imposed restraint for violation of which
the Government-but not private litigants--can complain.
• . . Courts should not, where Congress has not done so,
subject purchasing agencies of Government to the delays neces-
sarily incident to judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential sel-
lers, which would be contrary to traditional governmental
practice and would create a new concept of judicial controversies.
A like restraint applied to purchasing by private business would
be widely condemned as an intolerable business handicap. It is,
as both Congress and the courts have always recognized, essential
to the even and expeditious functioning of Government that the
administration of the purchasing machinery be unhampered.92
The Fulbright Amendment modified the Public Contracts Act
to enable potential suppliers to obtain judicial review of wage deter-
minations by the Secretary of Labor.9 3 It purported to amend the
92. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125-27, 130 (1940).
93. Pub. L. No. 429, 66 Stat. 308 (1952).
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Public Contracts Act and nothing else; indeed, the amendment be-
gins with the seemingly very specific words:
SEC. 301. The Act entitled "An Act to provide conditions
for the purchase of supplies and the making of contracts by the
United States, and for other purposes", approved June 30, 1936
(41 U.S.C. 35-45), is amended (1) by redesignating sections 10
and 11 as sections 11 and 12, respectively, and (2) by inserting
immediately following section 9 a new section 10 [which pro-
vided that wage determinations should be made on the record
after opportunity for a hearing and with a right to judicial
review] .9
Scanwell held, in effect, that Congress' amendment of the Pub-
lic Contracts Act to provide specifically for judicial review of wage
determinations should be taken as "a liberation [of lower courts]
from the bonds of stare decisis"95-- i.e., from any obligation to fol-
low a holding of the Supreme Court with respect to judicial review
of contract awards generally and under a wholly different statutory
provision. This amounts, in turn, to holding that an express amend-
ment of one statutory provision impliedly amended another as the
Supreme Court had interpreted it. The correctness of such a hold-
ing seems dubious, especially in light of the rule that amendments
by implication are never favored and should be held to have oc-
curred only if Congress' action is so clear as to leave no possible
doubt of its intention.96 Equally dubious was the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's citation in Scanwell of some of its own prior decisions
as having broadened the law of standing beyond that declared by
the Supreme Court in Lukens Steel.97 In Mason v. United States,"8
the Court of Claims similarly relied on lower court decisions as
helping to establish that an earlier Supreme Court decision was ob-
solete. 99 In reversing, the Supreme Court noted its "difficulty in
comprehending how decisions by lower courts can ever undermine
94. Somewhat ironically, Mitchell v. Covington Mills, Inc., 229 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1002 (1956), upheld a few years after passage of the amendment
the Secretary of Labor's determination of minimum wages for textile workers on an indus-
try-wide basis.
95. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
96. See United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 99-107 & n.12 (1964); Galvan v. Hess Oil
Virgin Islands Corp., 549 F.2d 281, 288 (3rd Cir. 1977); Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 505 F.2d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1974).
97. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
98. 461 F.2d 1364 (Ct. C1. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
99. Id. at 1374-78.
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the authority of a decision of this Court."'"
Subsequent to Data Processing and Barlow, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has continued to apply Scanwell, while at the same
time recognizing that disappointed bidders must meet the zone of
interests test. 0 ' It has managed to do both by, apparently, viewing
statutory and implementing regulatory provisions as presumably for
the benefit of bidders as well as of the Government-which seems
directly contrary to what the Supreme Court held in Luken Steel.
Some other circuits have taken a similar approach.
0 2
Scanwell has not won unanimous acceptance, however. The
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati Electronics Corporation v. Kleppe, °3 ex-
pressly rejected Scanwell's rationale. It held that a disappointed
bidder can challenge a contract award if he can show interference
with a protected interest under a separate statute (in that case, the
Small Business Act), but stated that "[absent such a congressionally
created exception, the general rule of Perkins v. Lukens Steel . . .
that a disappointed bidder has no legally enforceable right against
the government's award of a procurement contract retains its valid-
ity." '" In Edelman v. Federal Housing Administration, "I decided
three years before Scanwell, the Second Circuit followed Lukens
Steel, holding broadly that a disappointed bidder lacks standing to
sue. More recently, in Morgan Associates v. United States Postal
Service,"° it held against a disappointed bidder on the merits but
refused either to reaffirm or overrule Edelman, saying that "[w]e re-
frain from entering these lists until a case more compelling on the
merits comes before us."'0 7 At least two district courts in the Second
Circuit have held that Lukens Steel and Edelman still control. 0 8
100. 412 U.S. at 396. In Federal Elec. Corp. v. United States, 486 F.2d 1377, 1382 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974), the Court of Claims indicated that it had re-
ceived and duly noted the Supreme Court's message.
101. See Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. (Concica) v. Hannah, 459 F.2d
1183 (D.C. Cir. 1972); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 950
(1971); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
102. Eg., William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 485 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.
1973); Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973).
103. 509 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 1086.
105. 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967).
106. 511 F.2d 1223 (2d Cir. 1975).
107. 1d. at 1225 n.3.
108. Self-Powered Lighting, Ltd. v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 1267, 1271-72 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Standard Eng'r and Constructors, Inc. v. United States Equal Protection Agency, 483
F. Supp. 1163, 1166-67 (D. Conn. 1980).
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Decisions in one or two other circuits seem to indicate some
uncertainty. ,09
Meanwhile, the District of Columbia Circuit itself, although
adhering to Scanwell, has limited the effect of that decision. When
decided, Scanwell seemed to imply that a disappointed bidder able
to persuade a court of impropriety in a contract award to a competi-
tor would be entitled to an injunction or declaratory judgment to
prevent the Government from proceeding with the contract. This,
obviously, would have thrown open judicial doors to widespread lit-
igation. It could also have brought about substantial delays and ad-
ded costs in public programs dependent on the procurement
process-the basic point noted by the Supreme Court in Lukens
Steel. In apparent though possibly belated recognition of these
problems, subsequent District of Columbia Circuit decisions have
eased the impact of Scanwell in two ways. They have emphasized
that procurement officers have wide discretion in determining such
questions as whether a deviation from specifications is material or
immaterial, and that so long as that discretion is exercised reason-
ably a court should not substitute its judgment for theirs merely be-
cause it would have reached an opposite conclusion had it decided
the matter initially." 0 Further, these decisions indicate that disap-
pointed bidders may generally be entitled, at most, to damages
rather than to an injunction or declaratory relief, and that the meas-
ure of such damages may be only the costs they incurred in prepar-
ing their bids."'I In such circumstances, the cost of a lawsuit plus
109. Compare Airco, Inc. v. Energy Research and Dev. Administration, 528 F.2d 1294,
1296 (7th Cir. 1975), with Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd., 616 F.2d 341, 342-43 (7th
Cir. 1980).
There are decisions in both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits denying standing to disap-
pointed bidders seeking to challenge purchasing determinations by the Tennessee Valley
Authority. PRI Pipe Supports v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 494 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss.
1980); Inryco, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 471 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); GF Busi-
ness Equipment, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 430 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), aff'd,
556 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1977). These decisions apply the zone test, which accords with the
general view expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati Elec. Corp. v. Kleppe, 509 F.2d
1080 (6th Cir. 1975), and also with what appears to be the view towards which the Fifth
Circuit is tending, as indicated by Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir.
1978). They are not necessarily precedents as to disappointed bidders on government con-
tracts generally, however, since the TVA procurement statute, 16 U.S.C. § 831(h)(b) (1976),
confers wide discretion on TVA in determining whether to accept or reject bids, thereby
affirmatively indicating that it is intended to protect TVA and not bidders.
110. See Kentron-Hawaii, Ltd. v. Warner, 480 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wheelabrator
Corp. v. Chafee, 455 F.2d 1306, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455
F.2d 1289, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
111. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Hidalgo, 484 F. Supp. 1356 (D.C.D.C. 1980); M. Steinthal &
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the possibility of losing it often may outweigh the possible rewards.
All this does not, of course, affect the question of whether the
Scanwell court was justified in treating as "overruled" Lukens
Steel's holding that bidders are not intended beneficiaries of general
government procurement statutes, instead of leaving to Congress ior
the Supreme Court the prerogative of modifying the holding if ei-
ther determined that modification would be appropriate.' 12
In Control Data, the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished
its post-Data Processing and Barlow decisions according standing to
disappointed bidders on the grounds that they had actually applied
the zone test; that the disappointed bidder cases presented "special
factors . . . which made a grant of standing particularly appropri-
ate;" and that to permit the Control Data plaintiffs to challenge the
Secretary of Commerce's data processing interface standards would
offer the potential for impermissible intrusion upon the govern-
ment's prerogative to dictate the specifications for the products it
wishes to purchase, [which was] [c]haracterized by the Supreme
Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 2278 n. 12 (1980)
as the "'unrestricted power ... to fix the terms and conditions
upon which it [the Government] will make needed purchases,'"
quotin Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940)
Thus, Control Data relied on a Supreme Court decision which in
turn relied on Lukens Steel for a proposition that was closely related
Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Cf. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas,
521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 (1976) (denying recovery in tort).
Recovery of bid preparation costs will require a strong showing by the disappointed
bidder on several counts. See Morgan Business Assoc. v. United States, 619 F.2d 892 (Ct.
Cl. 1980); Burroughs Corp. v. United States, 617 F.2d 590 (Ct. C1. 1980).
112. Compare with the Scanwell approach the following statement in Penfield Co. v.
SEC, 143 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 768 (1944):
We cannot agree that an inferior federal court may make its prognostication
of the weather in the Supreme Court chambers, however well fortified in judicial
reasoning, and forecast that the Supreme Court "seems" about to overrule its prior
decision, and outrun that Court to the overruling goal. It is not a fanciful conjec-
ture that, if such guessing contest were permitted, the ingenuity of judges, stirred
by varied philosophies of governmental and social regulations, would find rational
arguments for overruling a score of Supreme Court decisions. To the strain on the
legal profession of many recent overrulings, some enumerated in the last para-
graph of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, should not be added that
of the overruling prescience of ten circuit courts of appeals and upwards of ninety
district courts.
113. Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 28 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 86,642, 86,649 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3237 (1981).
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to-and part of the rationale for-the Lukens Steel holding as to
disappointed bidder standing which Scanwell treated as overruled.
Control Data also held that, as a general rule (and despite the
language to the contrary in Scanwell), standing cannot be predicated
"solely upon an asserted economic injury,"'1 4 but that the zone test
and any other relevant prudential tests must be met. This holding
is, of course, in full accord with applicable Supreme Court
precedents.
A Debate Over the Wrong Question?
As this subtitle may indicate, the zone test as presently formu-
lated seems to me indeed subject to criticism but for different rea-
sons than those which have generally been urged.
In Data Processing and Barlow, the Supreme Court majority
substituted the zone test for the legal interest test as a determinant of
standing but added that "[tihe 'legal interest' test goes to the mer-
its." ' 5 Justices Brennan and White, while decrying use of the zone
test in considering standing, stated that evidence indicating the sta-
tus of "plaintiff's class [as] a statutory beneficiary" is necessary to
show reviewability,'I 6 and that stronger evidence to the same effect
is required "for the purpose of establishing plaintiff's claim on the
merits." "7 Thus, there was general agreement that, absent a specific
provision in a statute authorizing a plaintiff to sue government de-
fendants for its alleged violation, he must show that he is one of its
intended beneficiaries if he is to be entitled to relief.
Given such agreement, is it really important that a plaintiff's
possible status as an intended statutory beneficiary be considered
separately in relation to standing, reviewability, and the merits? In-
deed, is such separate consideration even practicable?
Procedural realities seem to me to suggest negative answers to
both questions. If counsel for a government defendant views the
plaintiff's intended beneficiary status as subject to attack, he will
presumably file a motion to dismiss, possibly coupled with an alter-
native motion for summary judgment." 8 When such a motion is
114. Id.
115. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
116. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 175 (1970).
117. Id. at 176.
118. Materials bearing on the legislative history of a relevant statute (as well as the stat-
ute itself) are generally treated as subject to judicial notice in connection with a motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., Young v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 606 F.2d 143, 144, 146-47 (6th Cir.
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filed, the practical question for the trial court is whether the case
should be ended immediately by a judgment for the defendant or go
to trial. If, to use the terminology of the Data Processing and Bar-
low majority, the plaintiff is not even "arguably" an intended bene-
ficiary, the case should be dismissed. If the trial court decides that
he is arguably an intended beneficiary but in fact is not, the case
should also be dismissed. If, to use the terminology of the minority,
there is not even the "slight indicia that the plaintiff's class is a [stat-
utory] beneficiary"1" 9 necessary to show reviewability, the case
should be dismissed. If such indicia are present but the stronger
indicia necessary to state a merits claim are not, the case should also
be dismissed.
These questions of standing, reviewability and whether a plain-
tiff has stated a merits claim will ordinarily be before the trial court
together. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure virtu-
ally guarantees this by limiting a defendant to a single motion to
dismiss assigning all of the grounds for dismissal which he wishes to
advance.20 The trial court will therefore examine the statute and its
legislative history with reference to standing, reviewability, and the
plaintiff's merits claim at the same time.
The language of rule 12(b) will tend to blur distinctions among
standing, reviewability, and merits in another respect as well. The
books are full of decisions which hold that actions should, or should
not, be dismissed "for lack of standing." Yet rule 12(b) does not
even mention lack of standing among the grounds on which a mo-
tion to dismiss can be based. Of the seven grounds it does mention,
the only two which seem relevant to the type of problem under dis-
cussion are "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter," and "fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."'
2'
When a government defendant wishes to challenge a plaintiff's
standing on the basis of prudential rather than Article III limita-
tions, should the ground assigned be lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion or failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted? For
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); In re Woodmar Realty Co., 294 F.2d 785, 788 (7th
Cir. 1961); Fletcher v. Jones, 105 F.2d 58, 61-62 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 555 (1939);
FED. R. EvID. 201(f). If a court feels otherwise, or if additional materials not subject to
judicial notice are brought to the court's attention, the motion to dismiss must be treated,
under rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "as one for summary judgment."
119. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 175 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
120. Rule 12(b) was amended in 1946 to prevent successive dismissal motions. See 2A J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 2440-2442 (2d ed. 1981).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1), (6).
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the defendant's counsel, the obvious answer is to assign both, as rule
12(b) expressly permits. If the court agrees with his contention that
the case should be dismissed, it can then dismiss under whichever of
the two rubrics it, rather than counsel, considers appropriate.
Taking the foregoing considerations into account, it seems to
me neither realistic nor particularly useful to require (in theory) that
trial courts examine the fine and shadowy gradations between what
is arguably protected and what is actually protected, or between the
indicia of protection necessary to show reviewability and those re-
quired to state a merits claim. In determining whether to grant or
deny a governmental defendant's dismissal motion in this kind of
case, the question is whether, primarily on the basis of the trial
court's examination of the relevant statutory provisions and their
legislative history, the court believes a private right of action should
be implied because the plaintiff is an intended statutory beneficiary.
Almost inevitably a court will find itself deciding this question even
if it has set out to do something else. In Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Commission, for example, the Supreme Court first stated
that, based on the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff ex-
changes " 'are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected'
by the Commerce Clause."' 22 It then stated, only a few sentences
later, that the exchanges' members "suffer an actual injury within
the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause."'' 23
All this seems to me to point to the desirability of eliminating
any theoretical distinction between the tests applicable in determin-
ing the existence of an implied statutory right of action against gov-
ernmental and against private defendants. As noted earlier in this
article, the legal interest test formulated as to a private defendant in
Railroad Company v. Ellerman was later applied to governmental
defendants in cases like Tennessee Electric Power Company v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority. The rule of Cort v. Ash, with the gloss ad-
ded by later Supreme Court decisions, could similarly be applied to
governmental defendants without thereby changing the zone test by
much more than deletion of "arguably" from its composition. This,
it seems to me, would result in a single and more workable test
which would be applicable whether a case was brought against pri-
vate defendants, governmental defendants, or-as has occurred in at
122. 429 U.S. 318, 320-21 n.3 (1977).
123. Id. at 321 n.3.
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least two cases'24 and can be expected to reoccur in others-both.
124. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
The Court did not suggest in either case that different tests might be applicable with
respect to the governmental and the private defendants.
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